We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effect of financial and non-financial rewards on the performance of agents recruited by a public health organization to promote HIV prevention and sell condoms. We find that: (i) non-financial rewards are more effective than either financial rewards or a volunteering agreement; (ii) both financial and non-financial incentives are complements to pro-social motivation; (iii) the response to both types of incentives is stronger when their relative value is higher. Overall, the findings demonstrate the power of non-financial rewards to motivate agents in settings where there are limits to the use of financial incentives.
Introduction
Understanding what motivates individuals to devote time and effort to work endeavors is a question that lies at the core of the social sciences. The answer is crucial both to understanding observed behavior and to designing incentive mechanisms that align the individuals' interests with the interests of the organization for which they work. As a consequence, the design of optimal incentive contracts has been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical research.
Empirical contributions, however, mainly focus on the effect of financial rewards in settings in which employee effort only benefits the employer (Bandiera et al. 2011; Oyer and Schaefer 2011) . Much less attention has been paid to incentives in organizations, such as governmental and non-governmental organizations, that hire agents to perform pro-social tasks, namely tasks that create benefits enjoyed by those other than the employer and employees. A notable exception is the literature on the effect of monetary incentives on teachers' performance, which finds markedly mixed results. (Duflo et al. 2012; Fryer 2011; Lavy 2002; Glewwe et al. 2010; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011) .
The theoretical literature suggests reasons why the effect of monetary incentives on performance in private and pro-social tasks might differ. Mission-driven organizations benefit from matching with workers whose interests are aligned with the missionand these individuals might respond less to financial rewards or even deliver a weaker performance if financial incentives displace other sources of motivation. In particular, to the extent that agents are motivated by the externalities generated through pro-social tasks, this motivation may interact positively or negatively with financial incentives Tirole 2003, 2006; Besley and Ghatak 2005; Dixit 2002 ). The literature also indicates that non-monetary incentives might be a useful alternative to performance pay schemes in settings where the power of the latter is limited. 1
Informed by these insights, we design a field experiment to evaluate the effect of incentives on the performance of agents in a public health organization. Our design facilitates the comparison of monetary and non-monetary incentives and allows us to assess the interaction between both types of incentives and pro-social motivation of the agents. We collaborate with a public health organization based in Lusaka, Zambia, which recruits and trains hairdressers and barbers to provide information about HIV prevention and sell condoms in their shops. Our setting is representative of many health delivery programs in developing countries, where embedded community agents are called upon to deliver services and products, and where effective incentive design remains a significant challenge (Bhattacharyya and Winch 2001; Mathauer and Imhoff 2006) .
The experiment randomly assigns 1,222 agents located in 200 distinct geographical areas to 1 Many organizations, ranging from large corporations to NGOs, also use a range of non-financial performance rewards to motivate their employees. For example, Larkin (2011) uses observational data to study a non-linear incentive scheme that provides employees of a software firm with a gold star and company-wide recognition if they meet an annual performance threshold. His evidence suggests that employees forgo 27,000 USD worth of revenue to obtain the non-financial reward.
one of four groups that receive different rewards based on condom sales, the only dimension of performance that can be measured precisely and objectively. Agents in the control group receive no rewards, while agents in the three treatment groups receive financial margins at the bottom and the top of the feasible range, and non-financial rewards, respectively. The smaller and larger financial margin treatments pay a 10 percent and 90 percent margin on each condom sale, respectively, whereas the non-financial scheme provides social recognition in the form of stars posted on a thermometer displaying condom sales ("star" treatment) in the agent's shop.
Our design has four features that allow a clean identification of the effect of financial and nonfinancial incentives on performance and of the underlying mechanisms. First, agents are not aware that they are part of an experiment, which minimizes the risk that their responses are driven by experimenter effects. Second, to minimize contamination between different treatment groups, we randomize at the neighborhood level, so that all agents in the same neighborhood receive the same treatment. This also allows treatment-specific peer effects to emerge within-neighborhood. Third, we design an experimental game to elicit a quantitative measure of motivation "for the cause" to test directly whether the response to incentives depends on the agents' motivation. Fourth, we track agents' performance over one year and thus can separate responses due to the novelty of the program from actual long-run responses.
The first part of our empirical analysis shows that non-financial incentives are effective at promoting sales, while the effect of financial incentives is much smaller and not significantly different from zero. On average, agents in the star treatment sell over twice as many condoms as agents in any other group. On the extensive margin, agents in the star treatment are 12 percentage points more likely to make any sale (a 32 percent increase with respect to the mean of the control group).
We show that the differential effect of non-financial rewards is stable throughout the one-year period, thus ruling out that results are driven by a novelty effect.
The magnitude of the estimated treatment effects is such that had all agents been offered nonfinancial incentives, they would have sold 22,496 condoms compared to 10,686 / 11,938 / 12,504 had they all been offered the volunteer contract, small financial margins and large financial margins, respectively. Using existing estimates of the health impact of condom use, our estimates imply that offering non-financial incentives to all agents would have saved 112 disability adjusted life years (DALYs), compared to 53 / 60 / 62 DALYs in the three counterfactual scenarios, and are the most cost-effective of the four schemes. 2 A possible explanation for why financial rewards are not effective at promoting sales is that, even in the high margin treatment, average earning potential was low because of low demand for the product. 3 However, low demand cannot explain why non-financial rewards are effective and financial rewards are not, unless treatment affects demand directly. Our research design allows us to rule out that the star treatment increases sales by increasing demand, e.g. through advertising.
Our strategy has three prongs. First, we survey a random sample of customers to probe the effectiveness of promotional materials such as posters that are given to agents in all treatments vis-à-vis the thermometer that is only given to agents in the star treatment. The survey reveals that customers are aware of the former but not of the latter. Second, we implement a "placebo star reward" treatment, namely we randomly provide a subsample of salons in the control and financial reward treatments with a thermometer that looks identical to the treatment thermometer except that it reports the average sales in the area, rather than individual sales. Contrary to the advertising hypothesis, we find that the placebo star treatment has no effect on sales. Finally, we show that agents in the star treatment behave differently on dimensions that are correlated with sales effort, such as displaying promotional materials and filling in sales records.
The second part of the analysis explores mechanisms driving the estimated treatment effects. To test whether the response to incentives depends on the agents' motivation for the cause, we elicit a measure of motivation through an experimental game implemented during agents' orientation for the program. The game has the same payoff structure as the classic dictator game but is contextualized so that donations are given to an existing charity that provides care to HIV/AIDS patients. This contextualization helps elicit motivation for the relevant cause and fits the game naturally into the orientation program. We find that the donation in the experimental game is a strong predictor of sales performance; agents who donate more than the median sell 51 percent more condoms than the average agent in the control group. We complement this incentive-compatible measure by collecting survey information on self-reported motivation. We find that non-financial incentives leverage pro-social motivation: they are more than twice as effective for agents who are motivated by the cause as for those who are not, as measured both by their donation in the dictator game and by personal characteristics correlated with motivation. High financial margins are also more effective for agents who score higher on our measure of pro-social motivation, while low financial margins are equally ineffective for both groups of agents. These findings indicate that incentives, especially non-financial incentives, are complementary to pro-social motivation in this context. Second, the responses to both financial and non-financial incentives are stronger when the utility associated with financial and non-financial rewards is higher. In particular we show that financial incentives increase sales for the poorest agents in our sample, for whom the relative value of rewards is higher. To use a measure correlated with variation in the relative value of non-financial incentives we exploit the intuition that these might be more valuable when they are visible to a larger peer group. To implement this test we exploit the naturally occurring variation in the number of salons in each neighborhood. We find that the marginal effect of non-financial incentives is increasing in the number of neighboring salons that also received non-financial incentives, whereas the effect of the other incentive treatments is zero regardless of the number of neighboring salons.
Taken together, the results support the idea that non-monetary incentives are a useful alternative to performance pay schemes in settings where the power of the latter is limited. Our findings contribute to the broad literature that evaluates the effect of incentives in for-profit firms and to the nascent literature that studies how to motivate agents engaged in pro-social activities such as volunteer work, charitable giving or blood donation (see, for example, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Lacetera et al. 2011; Meier 2007; Mellström and Johannesson 2008) and particularly in public service delivery.Most of this latter literature focuses on performance incentives for teachers (Duflo et al. 2012; Fryer 2011; Lavy 2002; Glewwe et al. 2010; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011) with two recent exceptions, both of which analyze the delivery of health services. Miller et al. (2012) evaluate the effect of providing financial incentives to school principals to reduce anemia among students in rural China and find a modest effect. Olken et al. (2012) study an intervention that links the disbursement of aid to the performance of health services at the village level in Indonesia and find that linking aid to performance improves health indicators. 4 In the context of this literature, our paper provides the first field comparison of monetary and non-monetary incentives and how these interact with motivation for public service delivery.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the context, data sources and the research design. Section 3 discusses the identification strategy. Section 4 and 5 present the findings and Section 6 concludes with a discussion of costs and benefits of the different schemes and the external validity of our findings.
Context and Research Design

Context
The field experiment was run in collaboration with the Society for Family Health (SFH), a public health organization based in Lusaka, Zambia. The experiment was embedded in SFH's new program for HIV prevention through the distribution of female condoms by hair salons, and we collaborated with SFH closely at each stage of the program, including salon selection, training, incentive design and monthly restocking visits for one year from December 2009 to December 2010. 5
The experiment is a "natural field experiment" in Harrison and List's (2004) taxonomy; all research activities were embedded in SFH's normal activities and agents were not aware that they were part of an experiment. To ensure behavior was not affected by experimenter effects we designed the experiment to fit within SFH standard procedures, as described in more detail below.
4 Related research examines the effect of salary levels on selection into the health sector and performance (Propper and Van Reenen 2010; Dal Bó et al. 2011) 5 Female condoms are embraced by many in the public health community as the only female-controlled tool for HIV/AIDS and other STI prevention (PATH UNFPA 2006) . Young, married women are the fastest growing demographic infected with HIV (UNAIDS et al. 2004) . Adoption rates for female condoms are higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in most parts of the world and earlier work in Zambia indicates that both men and women have expressed interest in the female condom (HLSP 2007) .
Like many NGOs in developing countries, SFH relies on community members to implement health programs. These agents are typically chosen for their role in the community (e.g., teachers, community leaders) and engage in pro-social public health related tasks in addition to their main income generating activities. For example, BRAC, the largest development organization in the world, engages 80,000 community members in Bangladesh alone. These community health agents work as volunteers and earn financial margins on the health products that they purchase from BRAC and resell in their communities (Reichenbach and Shimul 2011) . In another well-documented example, community health workers in Uganda effectively distribute injectable contraceptives in rural communities (Stanback et al. 2007) . Similarly, school teachers and principals in both developed and developing countries are often relied upon in health interventions to impart information and promote behavioral change among their students (e.g., O'Reilly et al. 2008; Miller et al. 2012 ).
Other relevant settings include for-profit employees asked to engage in pro-social activities, such as United Way fundraisers in the workplace (Kessler 2011 ).
In the program under study, hairstylists were identified as ideal agents for the delivery of this health serviceboth because the familiarity between the stylist and the client creates the potential for successful targeting of female condoms to "at risk" customers, and because during the period that a client is in the salon, he or she is a captive audience, allowing the stylist to provide information about HIV prevention generally and specifically about the female condom. Finally, hair salons are numerous and distributed throughout Lusaka. Our census of salons, implemented as part of the research design, found just over 2,500 hair salons, serving a population of about 2 million (2,198,996, according to the 2010 Census of Population and Housing for Zambia).
The first stage of the program consists of distributing letters to hairstylists to invite them to attend a one-day training program for the promotion of female condoms. The invitation letter is delivered by SFH representatives and no research organization is mentioned in the letter. To attract the largest possible number of agents and ensure a representative sample, stylists are offered K40,000 (USD 8) to attend the one day training. This is over thirteen times the average price of a haircut and is therefore likely to exceed the stylists' expected earnings for a weekday. Using information on self-reported earnings, K40,000 corresponds to 69 percent of weekly earnings for the median salon. The letter, reproduced in appendix figure A.1, stressed both private and public benefits of the program; in particular, the letter suggested that joining the program might attract new customers to the salons and might help the community by facilitating HIV prevention. In the case of multi-stylist salons, the invitation is extended to the person responsible for the management of the salon, which is either the owner or the general manager.
During training, stylists are provided with information on HIV/AIDS, female condom promotion, basic business skills and program details, including the randomly assigned compensation package. SFH normally trains the community members they hire for the promotion of health products since, like the hairstylists in our study, they are not necessarily familiar with the product they are supposed to promote. 6 To eliminate the risk of contamination between treatments, all stylists in a given training day are assigned to the same treatment.
At the end of training, stylists decide whether or not to join the program. Those who join buy condoms from SFH to sell in their shops. The purchase and resale price is set at K500 for a pack of two condoms, which is the same price as the male condom. While the recommended sale price is K500, stylists could have sold at a higher or lower price and we will take this into account in what follows. Stylists can purchase their first condom dispenser (containing 12 packs) at training at the subsidized price of K2000. After that, dispensers or single packs can be purchased at K500
per pack either during a monthly restocking visit by SFH representatives or by calling a toll-free number service dedicated to the female condom program. These are standard SFH practices for the distribution of health products. SFH sales representatives visit salons once a month to allow stylists to restock condoms and answer queries about the program. SFH provides a range of promotional materials including posters and display units while the toll-free number allows agents to purchase condoms if they miss the monthly restocking visit, or if they run out between visits. 7
In this context, the agents' choice variable is the level of effort to devote to the diffusion of information about HIV and to thesale of female condoms. Since this is a new product, unfamiliar to customers, the agents have to exert effort in explaining the female condom's proper use and benefits to persuade customers to make a purchase. For repeat customers, the hair stylists have the opportunity to follow up to encourage repeat use and troubleshoot any barriers to future purchase.
Effort is costly in terms of forgone time spent discussing other topics that might be either more enjoyable or lead to the sale of other products available in the salon, such as clothes or hair products. In addition to the social benefit, condom sales might carry private benefit depending on which compensation scheme the stylists are offered, as described in the next 6 The training took place between October and December 2009 and lasted for 40 days, running from Monday through Thursday for 10 weeks, with a maximum of 50 stylists attending in a single day. Training program and materials were designed by the research team in consultation with external communication experts. The training was conducted using a variety of pedagogical approaches (lectures, exercises, games, role-play, etc.) and teaching material (individual handouts, flipcharts, videos, etc.) .
7 SFH representatives were instructed to stop attempting to visit stylists who could not be found for three consecutive visits, i.e. three consecutive months. By the end of the experimental year 218 salons fell in this category. These stylists however were still formally enrolled in the program, and they could have called the toll-free number to resume the visits or restock condoms and are included in the sample throughout with sales of zero for each restocking visit.
section.
Research Design: Treatment Groups
Our experiment is designed to test the effect of financial and non-financial incentives on agents' effort and performance. Agents are randomly assigned to one of four groups. Agents in the control group are hired as volunteers and receive no incentives, financial or otherwise.
The incentive schemes are designed to introduce exogenous variation in financial and nonfinancial rewards. We link rewards to condom sales because this is the only dimension of performance that can be quantified precisely and objectively. Agents in the small financial margin treatment group receive K50 for each condom pack sold, a 10 percent margin over the retail price. K50 is the smallest bill commonly in circulation, making this the smallest payment that is easily implementable. For comparison, BRAC offers margins on health products to its community health volunteers that range from 7.7 percent to 33.8 percent (Reichenbach and Shimul 2011) .
Agents in the large financial margin treatment group receive K450 for each condom pack sold, a 90 percent margin over the retail price. K450 is the highest incentive compatible margin, since agents would have the incentive to buy and dispose of the condoms if the reward were larger than the purchase price. To put these numbers in context, consider that the average stylist in our sample charges K3000 for a haircut. Whether devoting time to condom sales is more profitable than devoting time to cutting hair therefore depends on whether stylists can sell a pack in less than 1/6th of the time it takes them to do a haircut, other things equal. Thus the power of the rewards depends on other things that affect sales, including demand. 8
Agents in the non-financial reward (stars) treatment group receive a star for each condom pack sold. These agents are provided with a thermometer, akin to those used in charitable fundraisers, which they are instructed to post in a visible location in the salon/shop. Each sale is rewarded with a star stamped on the thermometer, which is labelled as measuring the stylist's contribution to the health of their community. The thermometer is designed to create a visual link between packs sold and health outcomes, making social impact salient (Grant 2007 ) and effectively rewarding stylists for marginal contributions to the cause. In addition, stylists who sell more than 216 packs during the experimental year are invited to a ceremony together with five guests of their choosing. During the ceremony, the stylist is awarded a certificate by a well-known and respected figure in the health sector in Zambia.
The design of the non-financial reward scheme was driven by the need to balance two equally important considerations. On the one hand, we needed the scheme to have commonly observed features of non-financial rewards, such as the award of a certificate or a ceremony to top perform-ers. This was key for realism and the generalizability of the findings. On the other, we needed the financial and non-financial treatments to be as similar as possible on all dimensions so that any difference between them could be ascribed to the nature of the reward, rather than to the structure of the incentive scheme, e.g. its convexity. For this reason, agents in all treatments earn rewards for each pack sold and rewards are a linear function of sales. It is important to stress that adding the ceremony to the non-financial treatment does not introduce elements of competition or a tournament structure, as the ceremony is planned for all agents who reach the threshold. Therefore, at low sale levels financial and non-financial incentives have the same linear structure, at high sale levels the non-financial scheme has an additional lump sum benefit past a given threshold. Whether this structural difference can drive differences in performance is a matter for empirical analysis, which is beyond the scope of this study.
Importantly, the NGO monitors sale performance of stylists in all four groups to the same extent, which implies that treatments do not provide different incentives for career concerns or other reasons to establish a good reputation with the NGO. This similarity is evident to stylists because at the end of each restocking visit, they are told how many condoms they had restocked the previous month and, when applicable, the reward they receive as a result, as well as the number of potentially protected sexual intercourses resulting from the restocked condoms, linking their effort to the prevention of STIs and unplanned pregnancies. Finally, rewards (financial and non-financial) are calculated based on restocking decisions during the previous restocking visit and are paid by the SFH sales representative at each monthly visit.
To measure performance we use restocking rather than sales because restocking can be precisely measured through invoice and inventory data, whereas we cannot monitor sales directly and stylists might intentionally misreport them or report them with error. It is important to note that none of the incentive treatments makes it worthwhile for agents to buy stock if they do not plan to sell it. Indeed, even in the large financial margin treatment, the reward is less than the price of a pack. Thus restocking choices are a good proxy for sales. Finally, rewards are paid at the monthly visit after the re-stocking purchase to avoid delegating the computation of rewards to the sales representatives and to make sure they have the exact quantity of rewards to distribute at each round. 10 9 At the end of the restocking session, all agents in the control group were told: "Now, I have good news for you today. Because of your hard work and great sales performance in the last month, you have potentially protected. . . . . . sexual intercourses. You have therefore helped your clients protect themselves against STIs and unplanned pregnancies." Agents in the reward treatments were told "Now, I have good news for you today. Because of your hard work and great sales performance in the last month, you have earned a reward of . . . . . . (Kwacha or stars). In addition to that, you have potentially protected . . . .. (# of packs X 2) sexual intercourses. You have therefore helped your clients protect themselves against STIs and unplanned pregnancies."
10 All of our main results are robust to using sales based on stock observed by the sales representative as our outcome measure. Delaying the delivery of rewards by five weeks may lower the value of the reward if stylists have high discount rates, though stylists making regular sales receive rewards each restocking visit. Though restocking decisions are offset by five weeks from incentive delivery, the different incentive treatments do have the potential to influence the impact of liquidity constraints on restocking. Specifically, stylists in either of the financial incentives
Research Design: Randomization
To minimize the risk of spillovers between treatment groups, randomization is carried out at the neighborhood level with buffer zones between neighborhoods, so that all agents in the same neighborhood are assigned to the same treatment and salons' neighbors are either in the same treatment or not part of the program. To implement the design, we first conducted a census of all hair salons in Lusaka, collecting GPS coordinates and numerous salon and stylist characteristics.
We then imposed a grid on the GPS mapped locations of the salons, to divide the city into equal geographical areas of 650 by 650 meters each. We excluded a buffer of 75 meters on all sides of the grid cell, resulting in at least 150 meters between salons in adjacent areas. The resulting areas, each measuring 250,000 square meters, served as the unit of randomization. Salons located in buffer areas were not invited to join the program. The final sample for randomization consists of 205 distinct neighborhoods, containing 1,222 hair salons. 11
To increase power, we balance on a vector of variables that are likely to affect condom sales.
These are: salon type (hairdresser, barber or mixed), salon size (proxied by the number of employees), whether the salon is located near a bar (a proxy for condom demand), the number of salons in the same cell, the agents' total assets and whether the agent sells other products in their salon.
Randomization is implemented via the minmax t-stat method for the vector of balance variables across 1000 random draws. Figure 1 illustrates the outcome of the randomization.
While randomization occurred before the training invitation letters were delivered, the letters themselves contained no information on the assigned treatments to minimize the risk of spillovers during the course of invitation delivery. This also ensures that attrition between the randomization and training stages is orthogonal to treatment, as shown in Section 3.1 below.
Research Design: Data Sources
The analysis will use six main sources of data on stylists and condom sales. First, we conducted a census survey of all stylists in Lusaka, through which we collected information on characteristics of both the salon and the respondent. 12 Eligible respondents are defined as those in charge of may have more cash on hand after the delivery of incentives from restocking during the previous visit. Sales agents elicited restocking decisions before incentives were handed out to mitigate this problem, however, if stylists changed their mind about restocking after receiving incentives, they were allowed to purchase. We record these restocking decisions separately. Stylists in the high financial margins treatment do not change their decision significantly more than stylists in the volunteer control, which suggests that liquidity constraint differences do not have a meaningful effect on restocking. Stylists in the star reward treatment, on the other hand, do significantly increase their restocking decision after receiving their reward, relative to the volunteer control group.
11 Salons/shops that reported planning to close/move in the next six months were excluded from the sample, as were neighborhoods that contained only one salon.
12 The census was carried out from July to September 2009; the survey lasted for an average of 35 minutes. Two data collection teams worked concurrently. The first team consisted of scouts responsible for locating all salons and collecting GPS data. The second team then visited the shop and carried out the interview. Questions regarding the business included the type and quantity of equipment owned (mirrors, chairs, roller trays, dryers, etc.), the number of employees, the number and type of clients, the nature and prices of offered services and products, the monthly revenues and profit, and time since opening. Questions on the manager included demographics, the stylist's the daily management of the salon. These are typically the owner or the person managing the salon/shop on behalf of the owner for at least 4 days a week. 13 To minimize interference with the normal management of the condom distribution program, the survey was presented as a research activity and not linked in anyway to the condom distribution program.
Second, during the training, SFH personnel implemented a contextualized dictator game to elicit incentive compatible measures of pro-social attitudes toward HIV causes, which offers a measure of intrinsic motivation as described in the conceptual framework. Participants were told that, in addition to the training show-up fee (K40,000), each of them would receive K12,500 which they could keep for themselves or donate in part or in full to a well-known charity in Lusaka that provides care to HIV/AIDS patients including antiretroviral treatment. 14 The amount donated is taken as a proxy for the agents' motivation for the cause. Since this is likely to be correlated with the agents' wealth, it is always used together with asset and socioeconomic status measures in the analysis that follows. It is important to acknowledge that while donations might be higher than the individuals' truly preferred amounts because of social pressure (DellaVigna et al. 2012 ), the measure is still valid for our purposes as long as ranks are preserved, so that more motivated agents donate more than agents who are less motivated, even if they all donate more than they would in the absence of social pressure.
Third, we use SFH inventory records to build a precise measure of restocking, i.e. agents' purchases of condoms, with monthly frequency. This is the measure used to compute incentive payments and is our main performance measure in the analysis that follows.
Fourth, SFH sales representatives recorded restocking decisions and sales, and collected information on a number of program related issues such as sale prices and the visibility of promotional material at each monthly visit. 15 In addition, sales representatives checked the logbooks in which peer network, employee status in the salon, monthly earnings, length of employment/ownership, other-regarding preferences/attitude, and living conditions.
13 If the desired respondent was not present at the time of the sales representative's visit, an appointment was scheduled if possible or the representative returned on the following days. A maximum of three attempts were made.
14 Specific instructions for the game were scripted and read out loud. The script read: "We have recently received additional money for today's training. As a consequence we have sufficient funds to give each of you an additional K12500. [This was in addition to the 40,000 show up fee]. You can choose how much of this sum to keep for yourselves and how much to donate to Our Lady's Hospice, a local charity that provides palliative care that includes offering ART (antiretroviral) treatment for their HIV patients. If you wish to donate, please put your donation in the envelope provided with this form [form has pre-printed ID number on it] and drop it in the collection box. Note that the amount you donate is totally up to you: you can give nothing, part of the K12,500, or the entire thing. The amount you contribute will be kept completely confidential. We will give you a few minutes to think about it. When you've taken a decision, please drop your envelope in the box at the front." While instructions were being read, the helpers distributed identical pre-arranged packets of K12,500 in small bills to each participant. While the need to collect individual measures of altruism obviously prevents us from guaranteeing full anonymity, the design ensured that individual choices were not observable by other participants or by the training personnel. After receiving the money, stylists were guided one at a time to one of 5 booths where they counted the sum and separated the amount they kept from the amount they donated. The bills donated were placed in an envelope sealed before leaving the booth. Each participant then deposited the envelope in a box specially designed for this purpose sitting in front of the room.
15 Five full time sales representatives were trained to carry out visits and they rotated between salons and treatments.
stylists were asked to record condom sales and characteristics related to customers' HIV risk profiles.
While the monthly restocking visit surveys are a useful complement to the restocking information gathered from SFH records, we do not rely on these as the main source of data for the analysis since they are available only if the salon was open and the trained stylist was present when the sales representative visited their neighborhood. Overall, 60 percent of all attempted visits are successful, and these are equally distributed across treatments. 16
Fifth, two months before the end of the program, we administered a customer survey to investigate the customers' familiarity with the female condom distribution program through hair salons, and their use of female and male condoms. This survey is designed to provide direct evidence on the customers' perception of the treatments, thus allowing us to shed light on whether the treatments affect sales by changing customer demand. 17
Finally, at the end of the program we re-administered the baseline census questionnaire augmented by modules on business skills and on the agents' own health behavior. 18
Identification
To evaluate the effect of different incentive schemes on sale performance we estimate:
where y ic is a measure of condom sales by agent i located in area c over the year, and treat j c denotes the three treatment groups. Errors are clustered at the level of the randomization unit, the geographical grid cell area c, throughout. We estimate (3.1) on the entire sample of stylists who came to training and hence were exposed to treatment. Since agents choose whether to participate in the program after learning about incentives, the coefficients δ 0j capture the effect of incentives on sales performance through both the margins of selection and effort. In this setting, however, the role of selection is limited since almost all the agents who are exposed to treatment join the program. Section 4 presents detailed evidence on this issue.
The coefficients δ 0j measure the causal effect of the treatments on sale performance under the
Restocking visits lasted approximately one hour, during which sales representatives followed a detailed script and recorded both observational and survey data. Besides collecting data, representatives answered queries about the program, distributed promotional materials, allowed the stylists to restock and handed out incentive payments. 16 The most common reasons for a missed visit was that the shop was closed or that the respondent was not present. 17 To interview customers we selected 16 dense Lusaka markets, four for each experimental treatment. Surveyors conducted random-intercept surveys with individuals in the markets by approaching every fifth individual entering through the main market entrance, and asked if they would be willing to answer a few questions. Once consent was obtained, we asked whether the respondent frequented a hair salon in the market where the survey took place and a very brief set of survey questions about demographics, familiarity with the female condom, sources of information, purchase behavior and own sexual practices.
18 At end-line we re-interviewed 69 percent of the stylists from the original sample who attended training. At the time of the end-line survey, stylists were reminded that the restocking visits would not be continued but that they would be able to restock female condoms directly from SFH if they wished to continue distributing the product.
identifying assumption that treat j c is orthogonal to u ic . In support of this assumption, appendix table A.1 presents the means and standard deviations of agents' and salons' characteristics in each treatment, together with the largest normalized difference between treatment pairs. Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) we report normalized differences since, in contrast with t-statistics, they are scale invariant and do not mechanically increase with sample size. The table reports both the variables used to balance in the randomization procedure and additional determinants of sales used later in the analysis. Reassuringly, the randomization yields a sample that is balanced across treatments; out of 66 pairwise differences, only one is just above the rule of thumb critical value of 0.25. 19 This notwithstanding, the identifying assumption fails if the decision to participate to the training program is not orthogonal to treatment or if there are spillovers between treatments. We discuss these in turn below.
Participation decision
Of the original sample of 1,222 stylists chosen to participate in the experiment and randomly allocated to one of the four groups, SFH representatives successfully invited 80 percent to training.
The remaining 20 percent did not receive training invitations because they could not be found during any of the three delivery attempts.
Out of the 981 stylists who received the invitation 79 percent chose to attend the training. The high participation rate might have been due to the generous show-up fee (K40,000, 69 percent of weekly earnings for the median stylist) and/or to the fact that the invitation letter stated both financial and social benefits from joining the program.
Regardless of the high participation rate, the identifying assumption fails if the treatments affect selection at either stage. However, since stylists were not informed about treatments until the end of training, selection ought to be orthogonal to treatment. Appendix table A.2 reports the estimates of
where p ic is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the agent receives the invitation in columns 1 and 2, and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the agent chooses to attend training in columns 3 and 4.
X i is a vector of agents' characteristics that can be correlated with the participation decision and, later, with sales. Two findings are of note. First, the estimates in table A.2 clearly show that the participation decision is orthogonal to treatment. All coefficients θ 0j are small and not significantly different from zero. Second, the decision to attend training is correlated with some individual characteristics such as gender (barbers are more likely to attend), and self-reported donations to HIV-related causes. Stylists who attend training are five percentage points more likely to report giving to HIV charities. While this is in line with the theoretical literature that suggests agents in mission-driven organizations share an interest in the mission, the magnitude of the difference between participants and non-participants is small as the vast majority of invited stylists chooses to participate. We also note that the decision to attend is positively correlated with the number of stylists operating in the same neighborhood, suggesting peer effects might be relevant in this setting, an issue that we will return to when exploring the mechanisms driving the effect of incentives.
Spillovers
The identifying assumption fails if, because of spillovers, the control group is not a proper counterfactual for how agents in the treatment groups would have behaved in the absence of treatment.
This might be the case if, for instance, agents in the control group change their behavior as a result of knowing that other agents have been offered rewards. Four design features were employed to minimize the risk of spillovers across treatment groups.
First, we created a 150 meter buffer zone between each geographical area where salons are located to ensure that each agent neighbors either other stylists in the same treatment group or stylists who are not part of the program. While the research design ensures that all stylists in the same geographical area are assigned to the same treatment, this precaution can be undone by stylists relocating after randomization is carried out. Relocated stylists were allowed to stay into the program only if they moved within the same geographical area or to a new area with the same treatment as their original assignment. 20
Second, stylists attended the training with other stylists belonging to the same treatment group.
Third, the enumerators who delivered the invitation letters were themselves unaware of which training day pertained to which treatment. Fourth, the program was designed to appear similar across treatment groups to an outside observer. Most importantly, the sale price was identical across treatments and all stylists received the same promotional materials which included aprons, "sold here" signs, t-shirts and different types of posters. The sole exception to this rule is the thermometer poster, which was given only to stylists in the star treatment.
To assess the potential for spillovers through the stylists' social network, our baseline survey asked respondents about their relationships with other stylists in Lusaka. Reassuringly, the median stylist reported only one connection, whether relative, friend or acquaintance, with another stylist in the city. To monitor the evolution of this variable over the course of the program, we collected information on new connections with other stylists during each monthly visit. During the first four months of the program, 60 to 80 percent of stylists reported at least one new connection with 20 Only 12 cases occurred where the salon moved and remained in operation, staffed by the stylist involved in the research project. In 7 of these cases, the salon relocated within the same treatment cell. Three of the cases involved movement into a buffer area and the remaining 2 cases involved relocation to a different treatment. These salons were dropped from the study and all subsequent restocking observations are recorded as zeros.
another stylist in the city. After the fourth month, very few new connections were reported. Over 90 percent of the new acquaintances reported during the first four months met during the training and are therefore in the same treatment group. Finally, to detect spillovers and identify the stylists who might be affected by them during the course of the experiment, we asked sales representatives to note all questions and complaints at every monthly visit. In over 7,000 restocking visits, only one stylist asked about different incentive schemes. 21
While these three pieces of evidence are reassuring, they cannot completely rule out that agents in one treatment effectively responded to not being assigned to another. In the next section, we will exploit variation in treatments of neighboring areas to assess the empirical relevance of this concern.
The effect of incentives on sale performance
We begin by estimating (3.1) to evaluate the effect of the three experimental reward treatments on overall sales performance. Throughout we report estimates of δ 0j with and without a vector of salons' and agents' characteristics that can affect the willingness or ability to sell female condoms and therefore explain some of the variation in sales. These include salon type (barber or hairdressers) and size, stylist's sale experience, religion, socioeconomic status and wealth, and motivation for the cause.
We measure sale performance by the number of packs restocked over the year of the study, namely the number of packs that agents purchase from SFH to sell in their salons. Restocking is precisely measured from SFH inventory data and checked against invoices signed by the agents upon purchase. Most importantly, restocking is the performance measure used to compute financial and non-financial rewards. 22 The difference between sales to customers and our measure of performance is the number of packs bought by the stylists but left unsold in the salons. To measure sales to customers we asked sales representatives to record the number of condom packs in the salons at every visit; sales to customers are therefore measured with error to the extent that unsold packs might not be displayed. Despite this, the correlation between the two measures is 0.92 and similar across treatments.
As discussed above, we estimate (3.1) on the entire sample of stylists who came to training and hence were exposed to treatment. This implies that the coefficients δ 0j capture the effect of incentives on sales performance through both the margins of selection and effort. The next two sections provide evidence on the relative importance of these margins.
Selection
Columns 1 and 2 of appendix table A.3 show that incentives had no impact on selection in our setting. Only 3 percent of the stylists who came to training chose not join the program, and these are equally distributed across treatments. Two points are of note. First, to join the program stylists had to purchase a minimum of 12 packs at the subsidized price of K2000, which corresponds to 2/3 of the average price of a haircut in our sample. The fact that joining the program is costly allays the concern that the joining decision is moot, namely that agents might have agreed to join without ever intending to participate actively. Yet, the cost of joining is only 5% of the show-up fee, so stylists might have given in to social pressure. Second, as discussed in section (3.1) stylists who came to training were positively selected on their motivation for the cause, and therefore might have been willing to participate regardless of the compensation scheme. However, since four out of five stylists accepted the invitation to training, the practical relevance of this is limited.
Besides choosing to join the program at the beginning, stylists could also choose to quit during the course of the experimental year at no cost. Only 58 stylists (7 percent of those exposed to treatment) did so; of these, 53 never made a sale. The effect of the incentive treatments on the choice to select out is small for all treatments and significantly different from zero (p = 0.077) only for agents in the small financial margin treatment as shown in Column 4 of appendix table A.3.
Overall, only 10 percent of the 771 stylists who were exposed to treatment select out of the program either at training or later during the year, and the incentive treatments do not have a substantial impact on either selection decision. This implies that the coefficients δ 0j capture the effect of incentives on sales through effort rather than through selection.
Sales
Figures 2, 3 and table 1 show the effect of incentives on average sales and at different points of the sale distribution. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of sales in the four groups. The distribution exhibits bunching at 0, 12 and 24 packs, probably due to the fact that while stylists could purchase one pack at a time from SFH, buying one dispenser (12 packs) saves on transaction costs. Overall, 62 percent of stylists sell no packs other than those purchased at training, 22 percent sell between 0 and 12, and 16 percent sell 24 or more. 23 Average sales across all treatments are 9 packs, but conditional on selling any, stylists sell an average of 24 packs.
Beginning with average sales, Figure 2 shows that there is a striking difference between stylists in the star treatment and all others. Agents in the star treatment sell twice as many packs over the year. This is confirmed by the estimates in columns 1 and 2 of table 1. Four findings are of note. First, agents in the star treatment sell 7.66 more packs, which is over twice as many packs as stylists in the control group. This result is robust to the inclusion of stylist, salon and area 23 Results are robust to estimating Tobit models.
characteristics and is not driven by outliers in the star treatment group. 24 Second, neither financial incentive treatment affects sales. 25 Both coefficients are substantially smaller than the coefficient on the star treatment and not significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis that the effect of either financial treatment is equal to the effect of the star treatment can also be rejected at the 1 percent level or lower.
Third, we find that our experimental measure of motivation is correlated with sales and the effect is large: agents who donate more than the median amount to the HIV charity sell 3.36 more packs, which is equal to 44 percent of the effect of star rewards and almost 50 percent of the baseline mean of 6.96 in the control group. The fact that the donation in the experimental game predicts sales reassures us that social pressure to donate, if any, did not mask actual differences in motivation.
To allay concerns that the donation measure captures differences in wealth, the regression includes a measure of the stylist's own assets. This is correlated with the value of donation, as expected, but not with sales. Since self-reported assets might be measured with substantial noise, we also use information on whether the agent has completed primary school and whether they speak English, which are good proxies of socioeconomic status in our setting. This measure is also correlated with donation but not with sales. Fourth, the following agent characteristics are correlated with sales: barbers sell 3.32 more packs, possibly reflecting the fact that men are in charge of contraceptive choices in our setting, promoters with previous sales experience sell 5.18 more packs and Roman Catholics sell 3.65 fewer packs. The effect of the star treatment is thus larger than the effect of any personal characteristic. Figure 3 shows that the treatment effects differ on the extensive as well as the intensive margin.
In particular, 47 percent of agents in the star treatment sell at least one pack, compared to 35 percent in the other groups. The figure also illustrates that the average difference between the star treatment and the other three groups is driven by agents who sell more than 12 packs. This is confirmed by the estimates in columns 3, 4, and 5 of table 1.
Column 3 of table 1 shows that the likelihood of selling at least one pack is 12 percentage points higher for agents in the star treatment; this represents a 33 percent increase over the mean 24 We obtain similar results if the top 1 percent of sellers are dropped from the sample 25 We note that agents in the large financial margin treatment face a lower marginal cost (50 instead of 500) and could, in principle, have boosted sales by reducing the price. While this does not invalidate the identification of the effect of incentives on sales performance, it changes the interpretation of the effect of incentives on effort. We do not observe agents choosing this strategy in equilibrium. Our end-line survey shows that only four stylists reported ever selling a pack at a price lower than K500, and none of them were in the large financial margin treatment. This, of course, does not rule out that the agents tried lowering the price but this had no effect on sales, which is consistent with demand for this product being inelastic. The stylists' ability to take advantage of the low elasticity to increase price was limited by the fact that the same product was available from other outlets, e.g. chemists and drugstores, at K500. Unbranded versions were available free of charge from health clinics. In our focus groups both stylists and customers report some sales at K1000.We note that at this price, stylists in the control group and star treatment also get a margin per pack sold (K500) but that this is considerably lower than the margin received by stylists in HPFT (K950) so that the ranking of treatments in terms of incentive power is unchanged as long as stylists in all treatments are able to sell at the same price.
of the control group. Agents in the high and low financial margin treatments are equally likely to sell at least one pack as agents in the control group. Columns 4 and 5 show that the difference across treatments is stable at different points of the distribution in absolute value but it increases in proportion to the mean level in the control group. Promoters in the star treatment are 13 percentage points more likely to sell 12 or more packs, which is 39 percent more than stylists in the volunteer treatment, and 10 percentage points more likely to sell 24 or more, which is 80 percent more than stylists in the volunteer treatment. Promoters who are offered financial margins, either large or small, do not perform differently than stylists in the control group. All coefficients are precisely estimated and very close to zero.
A possible explanation for why financial rewards are not effective at promoting sales is that even in the high margin treatment, earning potential was low because of low demand for the product. Even stylists in the top quintile of sales and in the high margin treatment made only 3.5 percent of self-reported annual earnings from condom sales. While field experiments on performance typically analyze the effect of incentives that account for a substantial share of earnings, two other experiments use comparably small incentives and still find large positive effects. Chetty et al. (2012) show that offering academic referees a 100USD gift card to complete their reports on time decreases median survival times by 43 percent. The value of the incentive is equivalent to 0.1 percent of the average assistant professor salary in the US. 26 Goette and Stutzer (2008) show that offering a lottery ticket worth 4.3 USD increases blood donations by 12 percent among a large sample of potential donors in Switzerland.
More importantly for the interpretation of our results, low demand cannot explain why nonfinancial rewards are effective, unless the non-financial reward treatment affects demand directly.
Our research design allows us to rule out that the star treatment increases sales by affecting demand, an issue we will return to in Section 6.
Effect sizes and cost-benefit analysis
The evidence in table 1 indicates that agents who are offered non-financial incentives sell just over twice as many packs as the agents in the control group. While the sale level of the average stylist is low, 27 the difference between treatments is large in aggregate. The estimates in column 2, table 1 imply that if all the 771 agents had been offered non-financial incentives they would have sold 22,496 condoms, that is 11,810 more condoms than the counterfactual scenario where they would have all been hired as volunteers. Had they all been offered small or large financial margins, they would have sold 11,938 and 12,504 condoms, respectively.
To express these differences in a more relevant metric for comparing public health outcomes, our 26 Data from Scott and Sigfried (2011) refer to the mean salary of assistant professors in PhD granting institutions. Mean salaries for associate and full professors are USD 117,231 and USD 159,816 respectively.
27 Stylists in our sample report that condoms are difficult to sell because customers are afraid to try the product due to rumors about discomfort or malfunctioning. Successful sellers report the need to follow up with customers at least once or twice, since the product becomes easier to use with practice.
estimates imply that offering non-financial incentives to all agents would have saved 112 disability adjusted life years (DALYs), compared to 53 DALYs in the counterfactual volunteer scenario, 60
DALYs with small financial margins and 62 DALYs with large financial margins. This calculation is based on a model calibrated for Zambia by Population Service International, and assumes no substitution between male and female condom use (PSI 2012). 28 While this assumption is obviously crucial to evaluate the health impact of female condom distribution, it does not contaminate the comparison of the treatment effects as long as the rate of substitution between male and female condoms is the same across treatments. In support of this, data from the logbooks kept by the stylists indicate that around half of all female condom purchases came from customers who report using a male condom during their last sexual encounter, and, more crucially, this share is the same across treatments. Furthermore, none of the stylists in the program reported selling male condoms in the baseline survey, so stylists are not simply shifting the type of condom they promote.
To compare cost effectiveness of the four schemes we calibrate costs under the scenario that all agents are offered the same scheme and that each agent sell the average levels estimated in column 2, table 1. 29 Regardless of the incentive scheme in place, the organization has to incur a fixed cost per agent to cover training and administrative expenses. Financial margins, both large and small, carry an additional cost per pack sold (9c and 1c, respectively) to pay the reward itself, while non-financial margins carry an additional fixed cost per salon to cover the cost of the thermometer, the star stamp and the ceremony for those who managed to reach the sale threshold. 30 Much of the difference in cost effectiveness across treatments is driven by the fact that the number of agents needed to sell a given quantity of condoms differs substantially across treatments.
For example, if all agents (N = 771) in the program had been enrolled under the star treatment, the total number of condoms sold would have been equal to 22,496. To achieve that outcome would have required 1,623 volunteer agents, 1,453 agents receiving high financial incentives or 1,387 agents receiving low financial incentives. The costs per agent associated with the program are approximately USD 143.40. The cost per DALY saved by enrolling all 771 agents in a single contract type, including both fixed and variable costs, are therefore USD 2,078 in the volunteer contract group, USD 1,861 in the low financial scheme, USD 1,785 in the high financial scheme and USD 1,003 in the star reward group. To put this cost in context, Garber and Phelps (1997) estimate the value of a DALY at approximately twice annual income. The per-capita annual income in Zambia in 2010 was USD 1,020, so the cost of the star reward treatment compares favorably to the value of the health benefits it generates.
28 The model puts the DALYs associated with HIV/AIDs and TB prevention in Zambia at 0.005 DALYs per condom (PSI 2012) .
29 Because we see non-negative marginal treatment effects for higher densities of salons in all incentive treatments, it is reasonable to assume that scaling up would not reduce sales.
30 To scale up ceremony costs we assume that the number of those who reach the threshold increases in proportion to the number of agents. Thus as only one agent out of 185 qualified for the ceremony, we assume that four out of 771 would have qualified.
Spillovers and timing
Before delving into the mechanisms that underpin our findings, this section presents evidence on two issues that are key for the interpretation of the findings. First, we provide evidence that allays the concern that the estimated effect of the non-financial treatment might be contaminated by spillovers, namely by agents in other treatments reacting to not having been given stars. As illustrated in figure 1, some non-star areas border neighbor areas in the star treatments, whereas others do not. We exploit this variation to test whether the agents who are more likely affected by spillovers have higher or lower sales. Reassuringly, we find that being close to agents in the star treatment does not affect sales for agents in other groups, which casts doubt on the relevance of spillovers in our setting. Of the 586 salons not in the stars treatment, 41 percent are located in areas adjacent to stars treatment areas. The estimated treatment effect for being adjacent to a stars area is 1.30 (s.e. 1.39). 31
Second, we provide evidence that the treatment effects are stable through time, thus ruling out that the aggregate effect of non-financial rewards on sales is due to the novelty of being offered star rewards, or similar forms of Hawthorne effects. To do so, we exploit the fact that the SFH inventory files contain the exact dates of restocking and estimate (3.1) in each month, using the same set of controls and clustering errors at the level of the randomization unit as above. Figure 4 reports month-specific treatment effects. Two patterns are of note. First, the effect of the star treatment is positive and of similar magnitude in all months except the fifth, when it is close to zero. This might be due to the fact that torrential rains in months 3 and 4 depressed sales, so that agents could not sell the stock purchased in those months and did not need to restock in month 5. The magnitude of the star treatment effect is somewhat higher in the first two months and above the mean of the control group in most months, implying that agents in the star treatment sell at least twice as many packs as agents in the control group at any given point in time. Not surprisingly, however, the effect on monthly sales is less precisely estimated than on yearly sales. Second, the effect of both large and small financial margins is close to zero in all months, suggesting again that the aggregate results do not hide substantial heterogeneity through time.
We note that the observed pattern is also consistent with agents in the star treatment exerting effort only at the beginning to establish a regular customer base, and sell to the same customers throughout the year. From the principal's point of view this is not less desirable than reaching new customers, but the interpretation of the effect of stars through time differs if this is the case.
To shed light on this issue we use the agents' reports on whether the customers to whom they sold female condoms had used them before. The share of sales made to customers who had never used a female condom is naturally higher in earlier months (80 percent in month 1) but remains 31 Although the concern for spillovers might be stronger from stars, given the visibility of the thermometer, we also check for spillovers from the financial margin treatments. Being in a cell adjacent to any financial margin treatment has no statistically significant effect on sales.
substantial in later months (44 percent by month 10), suggesting that agents were reaching out to new customers throughout the program. More importantly for the interpretation of the treatment effects, the share of new customers does not decline faster for agents in the star treatment.
The stability over time of the effect of non-financial incentives suggests that the effectiveness of the star reward is unlikely to be driven by the prospect of qualifying for the ceremony. This can be inferred from the fact that, given the volume of sales, the threshold for being entitled to the ceremony (216 packs sold in one year) was unattainable for most agents. Indeed, stylists who sold at least one pack and who were assigned to stars treatment sold on average 3.1 packs per month, and only one stylist managed to sell enough to qualify for the ceremony. Had the effect of non-financial incentives been driven by the ceremony component alone, it should have disappeared after a few months as most agents realized the threshold was far beyond reach. The same logic suggests that the effect of the star treatment is not driven by the fact that agents in that treatment were motivated by career concerns in the form of networking with high ranked SFH officers at the ceremony to gain employment with the organization. 32
Mechanisms
The evidence in the previous section indicates that, in this setting, non-financial incentives are effective at increasing sales, whereas financial incentives are not. This section provides evidence on the mechanisms that underlie the treatment effects estimated above. Since the evidence in section 4 shows that the difference between treatments is stable throughout the duration of the experiment, the remainder of the paper will focus on aggregate year-long performance.
Agents effort vs. customer demand
While all stylists are given the same posters and other promotional materials, a key difference between the star treatment and all others is that only agents in the star treatment are given the thermometer, which provides a visible measure of the stylists' performance and their contribution to the program. Visibility could, in principle, lead to higher sales for a given level of effort through an advertising effect, or if the clients are altruistic vis-à-vis the stylists and buy packs to make them earn stars or if the clients take it as a signal of the agents' type and buy packs because they share an interest in the mission. 33 Assessing whether stars result in higher sales because they encourage effort or increase demand is key for a correct interpretation of the findings and to derive implications for incentive design.
To this purpose, we first test whether agents in the star treatment behave differently along 32 Stylists who participated in focus groups mentioned they were quick to realize the ceremony threshold was not attainable, but that nevertheless having a target and seeing how they progressed towards it through the stars motivated them to work in its own right.
33 A related consideration is that the star treatment could have attracted more customers to the salon. We compare the change in the number of salon customers between the baseline and the end-line across treatment groups and find no significant differences.
dimensions that are correlated with sales effort as measured during the monthly visits. The monthly data contain four variables that can be used for this purpose. In particular, we test whether the different incentive schemes affect the quantity of promotional materials displayed in the shop, such as posters and "sold here" signs, and the probability that the stylists fill in their logbooks as instructed. In addition, we use sales representatives' subjective evaluation of the stylists' interest in selling and promoting the female condoms and their judgement of the stylists' attention level at the time of each restocking visit. Table 2 reports the estimates of 3.1 using effort proxies as outcome variables. We find that agents in the star treatment display 0.25 more materials (11 percent more than the mean of the control group), are 7 percentage points more likely to fill in their logbooks (15 percent more than the mean in the control group), and score 0.10 more points or 1/7th of a standard deviation more on the "interest" variable recorded by the sales representatives. Stylists in the two financial margin schemes do not differ from the control group for any of these three measures of effort. Finally, stylists in all treatments appear to be equally interested during the sales representative's demonstration.
Overall, the results in table 2 indicate that, in line with the effect on sales, non-financial incentives promote effort on three out of the four dimensions that we can measure, while financial incentives do not.
Next, we test whether the star treatment changes customers' behavior, leading to higher sales.
First, we survey customers to assess directly whether they report being affected by the thermometer.
We ask customers whether they had seen promotional materials for female condoms in hair salons and, if so, to describe what that they had seen. Overall, 37 percent of the interviewees report having seen promotional materials. Of these, 92 percent had seen the promotional poster (which is the largest and most visible of the materials distributed), 36 percent had seen the "sold here" sign, and only 2 percent, or 15 people in total, report seeing the thermometer. Of these 15, five had previously used a female condom but none had bought them at a hair salon. This casts doubt on the interpretation that the thermometer attracts more attention than the standard promotional materials, giving stylists in the non-financial treatment an advertising advantage.
Given the low sales volume, however, the customer survey might fail to capture the responses of the small subset of customers who are indeed affected by the thermometer. The second step of our strategy consists of distributing a placebo star reward treatment to a random sample of salons in the volunteer control group and the two financial treatments. In the 8th restocking cycle we distributed placebo thermometers to 113 randomly selected salons and standard posters to the remaining 138 that were visited during that cycle. The placebo thermometer looks identical to those given to stylists in the star treatment except that the number of stars reflects average sales by all salons, rather than the individual salon sales. The effect of the placebo thermometer on sales gives us a measure of the effect of the star treatment through advertising, as salons in the placebo treatment look the same to an outside observer as salons in the star treatment. 34 The results, reported in columns 1 and 2 of table 3, show that the placebo star reward has no effect on sales.
The estimated effect of the placebo star reward is 0.22 and not significantly different from zero, whereas agents in the star treatment sold 1.58 more packs in their first month. Columns 3 and 4 explore the possibility that the effect of the placebo star reward is biased downward because stylists might have unsold stock they might sell from, and our measure of performance (restocking) fails to capture that. The results in columns 3 and 4 suggest that this is not the case; the effect of the placebo star reward on measured sales is -0.20 and not significantly different from zero. Overall, table 3 indicates that the thermometer is not an effective advertising instrument, casting further doubts on the hypothesis that non-financial rewards affect sales by changing customer behavior.
Pro-social motivation and the response to incentives
Financial and non-financial rewards can affect effort both directly and indirectly by interacting with the agents' pro-social motivation. To assess the empirical relevance of these mechanisms, we allow the effects of incentives to be heterogeneous as a function of the agent's motivation for the cause and we estimate:
where σ i is the measure of a stylist's motivation (whose level is included in the vector of a stylist's characteristics X i ) and all other variables are defined above. Our main measure of the agents' motivation for the cause is their observed willingness to donate, which, as shown above in table 1, is a strong predictor of sales.
The results in column 1, table 4 indicate that non-financial incentives leverage pro-social motivation: the effect of non-financial incentives is large and precisely estimated only for motivated stylists. In particular, stylists who donate more than the median amount in the experimental dictator game and are assigned to the star treatment sell 10.0 (s.e. 3.2) more packs than the control group (low motivated stylists in the volunteer group), while stylists who donate less than the median amount sell 4.3 (s.e. 2.9) more packs. The p-value of the difference is 0.096. This implies that non-financial incentives crowd in pro-social motivation in our experiment.
To provide further evidence on the interaction between treatment and agents' motivation, we use a self-reported measure of work motivation. In the baseline survey we asked stylists to identify what they enjoy most about their job: "making money", "being own boss", "making people look nice", "being connected to the community", and "other". The share of stylists choosing these are 35
34 Note that the placebo thermometer does not allow us to rule out whether clients buy packs to help the hairstylist accumulate stars, because, by design, the number of stars in the placebo thermometer does not reflect individual sales. Our earlier finding that none of the clients who report having seen the thermometer buy condoms from the stylists cast doubt on the relevance of this mechanism. percent, 6 percent, 44 percent, 14 percent and 1 percent, respectively. To measure work motivation we generate a dichotomous variable coding the first two options as profit and individually-oriented and the second two as socially-oriented. 35 Our measure proxies for the importance of social motivation relative to individual motivation. It is important to note that, in contrast to the donation in the experimental dictator game, this variable measures agents' motivation for their main task rather than for HIV prevention/condom sales. The interpretation below is valid as long as these are correlated across tasks performed by the same individual.
In line with the previous results, column 2 in table 4 shows that the star treatment is effective only for socially motivated stylists. Those who rank socially-oriented motivations above other motivations and are assigned to the star treatment sell 10.48 (s.e. 2.99) more packs than those who indicate individual-oriented motivations and are assigned to the pure volunteer treatment.
The interaction of social motivation and the star treatment is large and positive but not precisely estimated at conventional levels (p = 0.134). 36
Perhaps more surprisingly, the findings in table 4 indicate that also high financial margins appear to reinforce pro-social motivation; namely, the difference between the effect of high financial incentives on high and low motivated stylists is positive with a p-value of 0.026 in column 1 and a p-value of 0.144 in column 2.
These findings complement laboratory and field experiments on charitable giving (Ariely et al. 2009; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Lacetera et al. 2011; Mellström and Johannesson 2008 ) that test whether financial rewards crowd-out intrinsic motivation for the task. Most of these studies focus on social reputation, namely the possibility that financial incentives reduce the reputational gains from pro-social activities. In our setting, however, this channel is closed since the two financial schemes and the control group were designed to be observationally identical to an outside observer to minimize the risk of contamination via information spillovers. In particular, customers could not observe whether agents were receiving rewards for condom sales, and all condoms were sold at the same K500 price in all treatments. Since it is common practice for retail agents to receive a margin on the price of the goods they sell, the most likely inference from the customers' perspective is that all hairstylists were paid monetary margins, but we cannot pin down customers' beliefs in our setting (or, more germane for our analysis, hairstylists' beliefs about customers' beliefs about their motivation). More importantly, we would not expect differential inference about incentives across the volunteer and financial treatments, particularly since stylists in the volunteer control group have no way to credibly signal that they were not getting paid. 37
35 Results are robust to alternative ways of coding the baseline survey responses, for instance by coding "being own boss" and "other" as separate motivations.
36 In focus groups, stylists in the star treatment mentioned looking often at the thermometer with a sense of pride, as it showed them how they were progressing in promoting the female condoms and contributing to community health.
37 In addition, qualitative evidence from focus groups indicates no stigma attached to being paid for pro-social tasks, possibly because Zambia is a very poor economy, and that tasks seem more valuable if a donor, NGO or government are willing to pay for it. Customers reported that the price condoms were sold at ruled out that stylists were being Since it is unlikely that monetary incentives affected the agents' social image differentially across treatments in our setting, we are able to assess the degree to which they might crowd-out an agent's internal sense of intrinsic motivation. This could happen through a self-signaling mechanism by which the agents receive less "warm glow" because financial incentives make them re-assess their own motives for devoting effort to the task (Deci 1971; Andreoni 1990 ). Our findings suggest that this is not the case. 38
Heterogeneous responses by the value of financial rewards
This subsection presents further evidence on the mechanisms that drive the response to financial incentives in this setting, in particular we test whether the effectiveness of financial incentives depends on the weight agents put on their monetary payoff. We use two alternative proxies for utility from money, which correspond to two underlying reasons why agents might put different weight on monetary gains. First, we exploit the fact that, under the assumption of concave utility, the same amount of money is more valuable for poor stylists. To proxy for socioeconomic status we use information on the education level and English speaking ability of the stylist, and classify as "low socioeconomic status" the 19 percent of stylists in our sample who either do not speak English or have not completed primary education. In the absence of a reliable measure of wealth, these are the best proxies of socioeconomic status in our setting.
Second, we use information on whether stylists sell other products in their shops. Since most products are sold on commission, a revealed preference argument suggests that stylists who do sell other products, which represents 27 percent of the sample, might value commissions more. At the same time, however, these agents might be at a corner solution where they devote all their effort to the products that yield the highest margin, and therefore do not respond to variation in margins of other products. We estimate:
where φ i is the measure of stylists' motivation (whose level is included in the vector of stylists' characteristics X i ) and all other variables are defined above.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 4 estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. We find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that financial incentives are effective when their relative value is higher, i.e. for low socioeconomic status stylists. Compared to stylists in the control group (high socioeconomic status in the volunteer group), low socioeconomic status stylists sell 3.7 more packs when offered large financial margins and 4.9 more packs when offered small financial margins. Both effects paid extremely well for performing the task, and that knowing they were paid a margin similar to that paid for other products did not tarnish their reputation. 38 To minimize differences across treatments other than those arising from the compensation schemes, agents in all groups were reminded about their contribution to social value whenever they made a sale. See footnote 9. This may have mitigated the chance of agents re-assessing their motivation for the task.
are precisely estimated at conventional levels, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that small and large rewards have the same effect. The results in column 4 show that the effect of financial incentives does not depend on the stylists' sales experience with other products. 39
Finally, columns 3 and 4 of table 4 show that notwithstanding the fact that financial incentives are effective for the poorest agents, the difference is not large enough to reverse the comparison between the two incentive types: non-financial incentives are more effective than financial incentives for all groups.
Heterogeneous responses by the value of non-financial rewards
In line with the previous test, we now test whether the effectiveness of non-financial incentives depends on the utility weight of non-financial rewards. This section exploits two sources of variation that should be correlated with variation in utility from non-financial rewards. First, as treatments were randomized at the neighborhood level, agents in different neighborhoods have a different number of peers, that is agents in the same treatment group, in their vicinity. As the non-financial treatment enables stylists to make their sale performance visible to third parties, its effectiveness might depend on the number of peers who can see it for various reasons. For instance, social prestige associated with stars or reputational gains from contribution to society might higher when they can be showed off to a larger number of people, or stylists might be motivated by wanting to outperform their peers, or encouraged by the effort of others dedicated to the same cause. 40 For these reasons, a larger peer group might be correlated with a higher utility weight of non-financial rewards. 41 To shed light on the practical relevance of this mechanism, we allow the effect of treatments to vary with the number of potential peers in the vicinity of the stylists' salons, that is the number of trained stylists in the same geographical area. By design, the randomization procedures ensure that the number of salons in each geographical area is balanced across treatments (see appendix table A.1). This, together with the fact that selection into training is orthogonal to treatment, implies that the average number of trained salons is balanced as well. The average area has 4.5 trained salons with a standard deviation of 5, and none of the tests of equality of means between treatment pairs rejects the null. Reassuringly, the distribution of the variable is also similar across treatments, and no pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null of equality.
To evaluate whether the star treatment is more effective when the peer group is larger we estimate: 39 We also test for heterogeneous treatment effects by stylist gender and find no significant differences in sales outcomes.
40 SFH representatives' records from monthly visits indicate that, on average, the thermometer was publicly displayed in 43 percent of the star treatment salons. This provides a lower bound to the share of agents who choose to make their performance known to others since we do not observe whether they show it to selected individuals, or post it at other times when the SFH representatives are not in the salon. 41 The literature on charitable giving provides evidence that donations are larger when they are visible to others (Soetevent 2005; Karlan and McConnell 2012) .
where N c is the number of trained salons in area c, where the area is the unit of randomization and covers 250,000 square meters. The specification thus controls for area specific characteristics that affect sales regardless of treatment. For instance, customer demand for condoms might be higher in areas with more salons because more customers transit through these areas, or lower if there are more alternative outlets. Also, stylists in denser areas might be more effective sellers because they face stronger competitive pressure. The coefficient γ captures these effects. Second, the number of peers is not correlated with sales in the control group (γ = −0.052;
s.e. = 0.16). This allays the concern that density captures other area specific characteristics that are correlated with sales. Third, the interaction coefficients between the number of peers and the two financial treatments are small and not significantly different than zero (δ 11 = −0.18;
s.e. = 0.18; δ 12 = 0.15; s.e. = 0.17). This addresses the concern that density captures area specific features that make incentives more effective, such as the differential selection of stylists types 42 Further analysis, not reported, allows the effect of non-financial incentives to be heterogeneous according to the stylists' motivation for the cause, the number of possible peers and the interaction of the two. The evidence favors the interpretation that the two mechanisms act independently; both high and low donors sell more when surrounded by more peers, but high donors sell more for any given number of peers.
43 Further analysis, not shown, indicates that the distance between salons within the same neighborhood does not affect the effectiveness of the star treatment, presumably because neighborhoods are sufficiently small (500 meters by 500 meters). mentioned above.
To corroborate our interpretation that the interaction between the number of peers and the star treatment captures the incentive effect of social comparison, we note that agents in areas with more trained salons are significantly more likely to display the thermometer in their salons. One standard deviation increase in N c is associated with a 14 percentage point higher likelihood of displaying the thermometer, a 23 percent increase from its mean value, and the correlation is precisely estimated.
Crucially, for the interpretation of our findings, this is not driven by agents choosing to advertise more in denser areas; indeed the correlation between N c and the likelihood of displaying posters or the number of other promotional materials is small and not statistically different from zero.
A second source of variation that might be associated with the utility weight of non-financial rewards is the variation in the number of salon employees. In contrast to money, stars are not divisible and cannot be attributed to the employee who made the sale, and the thermometer does not bear the name of any particular stylist working in the salon. A priori, a larger number of employees might be associated with a lower value of non-financial rewards if stylists free-ride on the effort of their colleagues or with a higher value if group dynamics lead to encouragement and higher effort. To provide evidence on whether this mechanism is relevant in our context, we allow the effect of non-financial incentives to be heterogeneous as a function of the number of employees.
In our sample, 49 percent of salons are operated by a single person, 34 percent have two employees, 12 percent have three and the remaining 5 percent have four or more. We find that the difference between financial and non-financial incentives is constant at different salon sizes, thus ruling out possible differences due to differences in divisibility. The power of this test is limited by the observed variation in salon size as most multi-employee salons are quite small, but in our context we can rule out that the effectiveness of non-financial incentives is due to their non-divisibility.
Conclusions
We conduct a field experiment to provide evidence on the effectiveness of financial and nonfinancial rewards within health services delivery. We find that agents who are offered non-financial rewards ("stars" in this setting) exert more effort than either those offered financial margins or those offered volunteer contracts. Non-financial rewards elicit effort by leveraging the agents' pro-social motivation and by facilitating social comparisons among agents. The magnitude of the effects is such that offering non-financial incentives to all agents in our sample would save 112 DALYs per year, compared to 53/60/62 in the other three groups. Non-financial incentives also have the lowest cost per DALY saved (USD 1,003).
We designed the incentive treatments to reward sales performance rather than usage, since sales performance can be precisely measured while usage cannot. It is nevertheless important to discuss the link between sales and usage, since the health impact of the treatments depends on the latter.
We can provide two pieces of evidence indicating that customers indeed used the condoms. First, the stylists' logbooks, in which they are asked to record customer characteristics for every sale, reveal that by the end of the experiment 56 percent of buyers had purchased female condoms at least once before. This suggests the repeat customers used their previous purchases. Second, in line with this, 13 percent of respondents to our customer survey report using the condom.
The customer survey data also reveals that the effect of incentives on sales might actually underestimate the effect on usage. Indeed, while 16 percent of the respondents report receiving information on female condoms from their stylists, only 0.5 percent report buying from them because (unbranded) female condoms were available at the same price through other outlets such as chemists and bars, and available free of charge from health clinics. However, the share of respondents who ever used a female condom is more than double among those who report receiving information from their stylists (27 percent) vs. those who do not (12 percent), suggesting that the effect of the agents' effort in promoting the condoms on usage is larger than the effect on sales through hairsalons.
Two considerations are important to inform the scaling up of the non-financial reward treatment to include all eligible stylists in Lusaka. First, the fact that stars are more effective when stylists are surrounded by other stylists in the same treatment suggests that the effect estimated from a share of treated stylists might be a lower bound for the effect of stars when these are offered to all stylists, as the number of potential peers would be larger in the latter case. Second, the fact that the effect of stars is stable throughout the experimental year provides reasons for cautious optimism that this scheme might be effective at motivating agents in the long-run. While we cannot measure the effect past the experimental year, the absence of a clear trend reassures us that the effect is unlikely to discontinuously disappear as the treatment is extended past the year.
As is often the case in field experiments, the interpretation of the findings and their wider applicability depends on the key features of the specific setting. In our case, two features are of note. The first key feature is that, to minimize the possibility of information spillovers among agents in different treatment groups, agents were not informed of the existence or type of rewards when they were first invited to participate in the training for condom distribution. This reconciles our finding that incentives do not affect the selection of agents into the job with earlier evidence from the private sector and from the laboratory that suggests substantial selection effects (Bandiera et al. 2007; Dohmen and Falk 2011; Larkin and Leider 2012; Lazear 2000; Lazear et al. 2012) . In general, we expect incentives to affect selection, since different schemes might attract different numbers and types of agents. This is likely to be particularly relevant in the social sector to the extent that organizations are better off by hiring agents who are attracted by the mission as opposed to a generous incentive scheme.
The second key feature of our setting is that the task at hand is not the agents' main occupation. This has two implications for the relative effectiveness of non-financial vis-à-vis financial margins.
First, we observe agents who have selected entrepreneurship in the private sector as their main occupation. Non-financial rewards might be more effective for them because they reward the only pro-social component of their jobs. On the other hand, if non-financial rewards interact with the agents' pro-social motivation, they might be even more effective for agents who self-select into the social sector as their main occupation.
Second, even with the most generous financial margin scheme, earnings from condom sales are a small fraction of overall earnings because both demand for the product and earnings from each sale are low. Since demand for the product and the cost of effort are orthogonal to treatment, our results imply that the agents' marginal utility of stars is higher than their marginal utility of money, given their initial endowments of money and stars. In general we expect there to be a threshold level of financial rewards such that all rewards above that threshold would be more effective at eliciting effort than non-financial incentives, although not necessarily more profitable if financial rewards are more costly. In line with this, we do find that financial incentives are effective for poorer agents for whom the marginal utility of money is higher. Likewise, the power of non-financial incentives depends on their relative scarcity. In our setting no other tasks were compensated with non-financial rewards. If non-financial rewards given for different tasks are substitutes, they might be less effective if they are used more widely.
While we implemented a specific type of non-financial rewards, the general design principles are easily replicable and adaptable to other settings. Our rewards were a linear function of sales, which minimized discouragement or gaming effects typically associated with non-linear schemes.
Moreover, rewards were made clearly visible to third parties thus allowing social comparisons between different agents engaged in the same task, which proved effective at eliciting effort. Finally, they were awarded by a reputable and well-known organization, which might have contributed to their value.
An obvious limit to the use of non-financial rewards is that they cannot replace money as the main medium of compensation, and are thus of limited use in jobs where, due to the nature of the agency problem, performance pay accounts for a large share of total pay. Our findings however suggest that they can be a cost-effective means to motivate agents in the many settings where the fraction of variable pay over total pay is small. Ultimately, to assess whether and how non-financial rewards can be effective in other settings, future research will need to provide evidence on how the nature of the reward interacts with the nature of the task to attract, motivate and retain employees. Table 1 . We define an agent to have low socio-economic status if the agent does not speak English or has not completed primary education. We define self-reported motivation to be social if the agent reports "being connected to the community" or "making people look nice" as their preferred aspect of the job, in contast to "making money" and "being own boss". SFH is a non--governmental organization whose mission is to improve the health status of Zambians using social marketing techniques, increasing demands and supply of essential health products. Our programs include the promotion of CARE female condoms by hairdressers and barbers.
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What's the advantage of joining the program?
As of now, numerous hair salons and barber shops in Lusaka, Chipata, Livingstone, and Kitwe have successfully joined the program. Hairdressers and barbers from these salons and shops tell us that participating in the program has provided them with the immense satisfaction of helping their community and has attracted additional clients to come to the salon for other services.
How do I join?
If you are interested in getting involved, we ask you to attend training on HIV/AIDS prevention, adequate use of the female condom and promoting and selling strategies. The training will be held on ________________________ at LUSAKA HOTEL (ON CAIRO ROAD, NEAR KATONDO STREET) in Lusaka.
